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A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline
ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS & DAVID B. WILKINS*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Ted Schneyer was the first to call for "professional discipline" for
law firms in his 1991 article by the same title.' Schneyer called for the imposition
of an entity duty of supervision under Model Rule 5.1(a), which currently
imposes supervisory duties only on individual partners.2 He argued that the
possibility of sanctions against firms was necessary to encourage partners to
invest in structural controls, such as conflicts checking procedures, to promote
firm-wide compliance with professional regulation.3 He referred to such controls,
collectively, as the "ethical infrastructure" of the firm:
[A] law firm's organization, policies, and operating procedures constitute an
"ethical infrastructure" that cuts across particular lawyers and tasks. Large law
firms are typically complex organizations. Consequently, their infrastructures
may have at least as much to do with causing and avoiding unjustified harm as
do the individual values and practice skills of their lawyers .
4
Schneyer based his proposal for law firm discipline on an analogy to corporate
criminal liability, citing the increasing use of collective criminal sanctions in the
regulation of business corporations. 5 Just as some corporate wrongdoing is
"inherently structural," Schneyer argued that "bureaucratic failings and collec-
tive decisions.., play a significant causal role" in producing unethical conduct in
law firms.6 Moreover, he argued, some types of collective sanctions, such as
public censure or shaming, may be more effective against law firms than business
corporations, because law firms belong to a "reasonably well-defined ethical
* Elizabeth Chambliss is the Research Director of the Program on the Legal Profession at Harvard Law
School. David B. Wilkins is the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the Faculty
Director of the Program on the Legal Profession. We are grateful for the excellent research assistance provided
by Justin Osofsky.
I. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Schneyer, Professional Discipline].
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES) (stating that "a
partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct").
3. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 17-20, 23 (calling for entity liability).
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id. at 25.
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community.",
7
Schneyer's arguments have profoundly influenced subsequent debate about
law firm discipline. Indeed, it is difficult to find a law review article or bar debate
on the subject that does not begin with Schneyer's article. Yet while Schneyer
deserves great credit for initiating the conversation on law firm discipline, we
suggest that it is time to reconsider the regulatory framework that he proposed. As
we argue below, using Rule 5.1(a) as the vehicle for law firm discipline has
contributed to confusion about the goals of regulation and led to an impasse in
regulatory debate.
This paper proposes a new framework for law firm discipline. We argue, first,
that law firm discipline should be distinguished from partners' supervisory duties
under Rule 5.1(a). Rule 5.1(a) as currently written is unenforceable in large law
firms or in any firm with a centralized management structure. Indeed, many of the
infirmities that opponents attribute to proposals for law firm discipline actually
are infirmities inherent in Rule 5.1(a). Instead, we argue, the design and
monitoring of structural controls within firms should be recognized-and regulated-
as a specialized duty of management. We argue, further, that this duty of
"structural supervision" is best fulfilled by in-house compliance specialists, such
as law firm general counsel, loss prevention partners, and in-house ethics
advisors.8 We propose that all law firms be required to designate at least one
partner as the firm's compliance specialist and show how this approach avoids the
problems associated with law firm discipline under Rule 5. 1(a).
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE RULE 5.1(A) FRAMEWORK
A. THE FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT
The first problem with using Rule 5.1 (a) as the vehicle for law firm discipline
is that it limits the case for law firm discipline to the supervisory context. This
implies that the primary-or only-purpose of law firm discipline is to prevent
misconduct by individual lawyers. This problem arises, in part, from the structure
of Rule 5.1. Rule 5.1 defines the "responsibilities of a partner or supervisory
lawyer." 9 Most of the Rule focuses on the direct supervision of individual
lawyers. For instance, Rule 5.1(b) requires a lawyer with "direct supervisory
authority over another lawyer" to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct."' Rule 5.1(c)
defines the circumstances under which "a lawyer shall be responsible for another
7. Id. at 35.
8. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel,
and other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 559 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss &
Wilkins, Compliance Specialists] (examining firms' increasing use of in-house compliance specialists).
9. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1.
10. Id. at Rule 5.1(b).
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lawyer's violation of the Rules .. "" Most of the commentary accompanying
Rule 5.1 focuses on partners' responsibilities for direct supervision.1
2
Rule 5.1(a) focuses on a different kind of supervision-what Schneyer calls
"indirect" supervision. 13 Rule 5.1(a) requires partners and other lawyers with
supervisory authority to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform
to the Rules of Professional Conduct."' 4 The Comment explains that the
measures required to fulfill this responsibility "depend on the firm's structure and
the nature of its practice," but might include, for example, "a procedure whereby
junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a
designated senior partner or special committee."15
As Schneyer notes, Rule 5.1(a) is "clearly ... concerned with matters of
ethical infrastructure" 16 as opposed to the supervision of individual lawyers.
However, by making the duty to ensure that the firm has an effective ethical
infrastructure part of a rule that is otherwise concerned with the supervision of
individual lawyers, Rule 5.1 treats ethical infrastructure as merely a means for
preventing misconduct, rather than an end in itself (for instance, as evidence of
the firm's values and commitment to ethical compliance). Thus, Rule 5.1 treats
individual conduct as the primary object of law firm discipline.
Proponents reinforce this focus on individual conduct by the way they frame
the case for law firm discipline. Most law review articles calling for law firm
discipline begin with a few egregious examples of individual misconduct, such as
a partner's racist and sexist remarks during the interview of a law student; 17 a
partner's lie to opposing counsel about the existence of documents in discov-
ery; 8 a partner's repeated sexual harassment of his secretary; 9 or cases of large
scale billing fraud by senior partners.20 Schneyer, for instance, begins his article
by inviting readers to "[clonsider five well-publicized incidents involving
11. Id. at Rule 5.1 (c).
12. Id. at Rule 5.1 cmt.
13. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note I, at 17.
14. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(a).
15. Id. at Rule 5.1 cmt. 2.
16. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 17.
17. id. at I (discussing the response of the University of Chicago Law School to remarks by a partner at
Baker & McKenzie).
18. Id. at 2 (discussing the misconduct of a senior partner at Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine).
19. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law
Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271 (1996) (discussing the infamous sexual
harassment suit against Baker & McKenzie).
20. See Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self-Regulation, Socialization, and theRole of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 119, 121-26 (1998) (discussing billing fraud by the managing partner at Butler & Binion); Lisa G.
Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
205, 209-15 (1999) (discussing sixteen cases of billing fraud by senior partners at prominent law firms). See
also Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 259 (1994) (where the focus on individual conduct is evident from the article's title).
2003]
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misconduct in large law firms.' Proponents further narrow the implied object of
law firm discipline by focusing on intentional misconduct.
This focus on individual (mis)conduct is strategically ineffective. Opponents
have successfully defeated proposals for law firm discipline by arguing in part
that there is no evidence of widespread misconduct in law firms, or that what
misconduct exists is covered by the existing rules governing individual lawyers.
For instance, the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, more commonly known as the Ethics 2000
Commission, recently advanced a proposal for law firm discipline under Rule
5.1(a),22 but withdrew it by a 6-5 vote in response to opposition.23 Opponents
argued, among other things, that law firm discipline is "unnecessary" because
disciplinary authorities can proceed effectively under the rules governing
individual lawyers.24
Proponents' focus on individual conduct also reflects a fundamental confusion
about the goals of law firm discipline. The primary purpose of law firm discipline
is to promote compliance efforts by firms; thus, firms-not individuals-are the
object of regulation. While it is true that the regulation of firms as entities does
not fit comfortably within the criminal justice paradigm of the Model Rules-
firms, after all, have no mens rea comparable to individual actors-firms
nevertheless play an active and increasingly important role in lawyer socializa-
tion and the day-to-day interpretation of professional regulation. Firm policies
and procedures, both formal and informal, create economic and social incentives
for individual conduct; and such incentives are distinct from-and prior to-
individual bad acts. To ignore firms as agents, and shapers of individual conduct
(and misconduct), is therefore to abdicate a central duty of professional
self-regulation. Thus, as we explain in Part II, the strongest argument for law firm
discipline is not the existence of rogue partners, or proof of individual
misconduct, but rather the growing importance of firms for professional
self-regulation.
2 1. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 1.
22. See Margaret Colgate Love, Update on Ethics 2000 Project and Summary of Recommendations to Date,
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlovearticle.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Love, E2K
Update] (reporting that the Commission had accepted a recommendation to extend 5. 1 (a) supervisory duties to
law firms as well as individual lawyers).
23. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, Minutes Friday March 16-Saturday March 17, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-03-16mtg.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2002) (reporting the Commission's decision to withdraw its proposal for law firm discipline).
24. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Testimony of Robert A. Creamer, Joseph R. Lundy and
Brian Redding, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., A Risk Retention Group, to the American Bar
Association Ethics 2000 Commission, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-witnesslundy.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2002) [hereinafter ALAS Testimony] (stating that "the Reporter cites no instance in which a state disciplinary
authority was unable to deal effectively ... [with] ethical violations because of inability to prosecute a law
firm"). See also Symposium, How Should We Regulate Large Law Firms? Is a Law Firm Disciplinary Rule the
Answer?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 210-12 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium] (remarks of Joseph R. Lundy).
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B. THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The second problem with law firm discipline via Rule 5.1(a) is the theory of
collective management that is reflected in the current rule. Rule 5.1(a), as
currently written, makes all partners equally responsible for the development and
monitoring of structural controls in the firm. As Schneyer observes, this rule is
largely unenforceable through individual discipline because "the locus of
individual responsibility ... [is] inherently unclear.",
25
Disciplinary authorities may have difficulty pinning.., structural defect[s] on
particular partners (even on a managing partner), and they may be reluctant to
try, for fear of scapegoating some lawyers for sins shared by others. Thus,
authorities probably would not proceed... against any.., individual partner,
even if... MR 5.1(a) offers a theoretical basis for doing so .... 26
Schneyer proposes to solve this problem by making the firm as a whole
responsible, arguing that the possibility of sanctions against firms would provide
an incentive for partners that is lacking in the current rule.27
Given ... the importance of a law firm's ethical infrastructure and the diffuse
responsibility for creating and maintaining that infrastructure, a disciplinary
regime that targets only individual lawyers in an era of large law firms is no
longer sufficient. Sanctions against firms are needed as well.28
The Ethics 2000 Commission embraced the same logic in its initial proposal for
law firm discipline:
Although no change in substance in a lawyer's personal responsibility for
compliance with paragraph (a) is intended, it is hoped that the prospect of law
firm discipline will provide an additional incentive for each partner or
managing attorney to comply with paragraph (a).29
Yet, as opponents of law firm discipline have argued, simply adding an entity
duty to the existing rule does nothing to make individual partners more
accountable for ethical infrastructure. As a representative of the Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) states:
[E]very partner ... in a law firm has a personal responsibility to see that the
ethics rules are enforced. Not just by themselves, but by every other lawyer in
the firm ... So what does adding discipline of the firm qua firm add to that? In
25. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note I, at 10.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, November 2000 Report 333 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Model Rule 5.1).
2003]
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our view, it doesn't add anything ... [W]hen everyone is responsible, no one is
responsible.
30
On the contrary, opponents argue that emphasizing the responsibility of the
firm as a whole may serve to undermine individual accountability. 31 This
argument convinced the Ethics 2000 Commission to withdraw its proposal for
law firm discipline:
The Commission initially proposed to extend the duties in Rule 5.1.... to law
firms as well as individual lawyers. However, it became persuaded that any
possible benefit from being able to extend disciplinary liability firm-wide was
small when compared to the possible cost of allowing responsible partners and
supervisors to escape personal accountability.
32
Thus, the debate about law firm discipline appears to have reached an impasse.
Although Schneyer's article has prompted proposals for law firm discipline in
several jurisdictions, 33 so far only two-New Jersey and New York-have extended
supervisory liability to law firmS3 4 and enforcement has been infrequent. In New
Jersey, which has had law firm discipline since 1984, there are only three reported
cases of law firm discipline.35 In New York, there has been no public enforcement
and only two "private admonitions" of firms.3 6
30. Symposium, supra note 24, at 211 (remarks of Joseph R. Lundy). See also Am. Bar Ass'nCtr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, Comments of Robert A. Creamer Concerning Draft Model Rules 5. 1 and 5.3, to the American
Bar Association Ethics 2000 Commission, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/creamerlO.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2002) [hereinafter Comments of Robert A. Creamer].
31. See Comments of Robert A. Creamer, supra note 30 (stating that "the most effective means of controlling
the behavior of ethically challenged lawyers is the credible threat of the loss or suspension of their license to
practice law. Any shift from ... individual responsibility ... to the ... responsibility of the firm will diminish
the effectiveness of that deterrent"); ALAS Testimony, supra note 24 (arguing that "firm discipline ... will
weaken individual lawyer responsibility for ethics compliance"); Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS I (2002)
(stating that law firm discipline "may actually undermine individual ethical incentives rather than furthering
attorney accountability" [emphasis in original]).
32. See Margaret Colgate Love, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Final Report - Summary of Recommenda-
tions, Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlove-article.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Love, Final Report].
33. See Mark Hansen, Taking a Firm Hand in Discipline: New York Ethics Rules Pinpoint Firms - Some Say
More States Should Follow, 84 A.B.A. J. 24 (Sept. 1998) (discussing New York's adoption of law firm
discipline and reporting that a similar proposal was "shelved" in California); Arthur Burger, Donm 't Be Lulled by
Firm Immunity, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at 27 (discussing the rejection of a proposal for law firm discipline
by the D.C. Bar).
34. The New Jersey rule, which predates Schneyer's article, requires law firms to make "reasonable efforts to
ensure that member lawyers ... undertake measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers conform to the
Rules of Professional Conduct." N.J. R. OF PROF'L CONOUCT Rule 5.1 (a) (1984). The New York rule, adopted in
1996, requires law firms to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the
disciplinary rules." N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1- 104 (1996).
35. See In re Rovner, Allen, Seiken & Rovner, 754 A.2d 554 (N.J. 2000); hi re Ravich, Tobin, Oleckna,
Reitman & Greenstein, 715 A.2d 216 (N.J. 1998); In re Jacoby & Meyers, 687 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1997).
36. See ALAS Testimony, supra note 24.
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Opponents argue that this record proves that law firm discipline is unneces-
sary:
If western democracy was being threatened by all these bad acts of big firms...
surely at least one of them would have committed a bad act, and we would have
a public case on the record as a result of this law firm discipline rule [in New
York]. But we don't.
37
If there were a widespread perception among lawyer disciplinary authorities
that many important legal ethics rules were going unenforced because no
individual partner could be disciplined, surely more U.S. jurisdictions would
have acted to address the problem. The fact that only two jurisdictions have
done so-and that even in those jurisdictions only five law firms have been
publicly or privately reprimanded-is the strongest evidence that [law firm
discipline] ... is a solution in search of a problem.
38
To argue that law firm discipline is unnecessary, however, is to subscribe to an
extremely narrow vision of professional self-regulation. This argument suggests
that the only purpose of legal ethics rules is to respond to demonstrated
misconduct, or to fill the gaps left by other regulatory systems.3 9 We doubt that
Schneyer subscribes to this vision, given his substantial scholarship on the
political, economic, and symbolic functions of the Model Rules.40 However, he
invites this objection by the way he frames the case for law firm discipline. As
noted above, Schneyer opens his article by citing "well-publicized incidents" of
professional misconduct.4 ' Moreover, Schneyer expressly limits the role of law
firm discipline to that of filling the gaps left by other regulatory systems, such as
civil liability and agency regulation. He writes: "[L]aw firm discipline should
only be instituted if the alternative techniques leave regulatory gaps that firm
discipline could efficiently and effectively help to close."4 2
We subscribe to a broader vision of professional self-regulation-one that
demands that the profession offer its own regulatory strategy, rather than shifting
the burden to malpractice plaintiffs and other external regulators. Thus, we argue
that the case for law firm discipline, and by analogy the case for ethical
infrastructure within firms, stems directly from the profession's duty-and
privilege-of self-regulation.
37. Symposium, supra note 24, at 206 (remarks of William P. Smith).
38. ALAS Testimony, supra note 24.
39. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 24, at 205-07 (remarks of William P. Smith). "You know what we're
talking about here [referring to the Model Rules] is not an educational tool. What we're talking about is a
document that contains a quasi-criminal process. This is not the place to make statements. This is not the place
to effect social change." Id.
40. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989); Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What
the S&L Crisis Meansfor the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 639, 641-43 (1994).
41. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 1.
42. Id. at 12.
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II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR LAW FIRM DISCIPLINE
A. THE CASE FOR ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
U.S. lawyers increasingly practice in large, multijurisdictional law firms. In
1960, the fifty largest U.S. law firms all had fewer than 100 lawyers;43 today, the
fifty largest law firms all have more than 500 lawyers and the ten largest have
more than 1,000 lawyers.4W Between 1996 and 2001, the 250 largest law firms
grew by 45%.45 Most large law firms have multiple U.S. offices, 46 and most of
the largest firms have offices in more than one country.47
Because lawyers increasingly practice in large, multijurisdictional firms,
professional regulation increasingly depends on structural controls within firms,
such as conflicts avoidance systems, internal reporting procedures, billing
guidelines, and the like. Yet research indicates that most law firms have
inadequate structural controls.48 For instance, a detailed survey of conflicts
screening procedures in thirty-one law firms found that while most firms "take
conflicts seriously," many firms are hampered by "flawed conflicts detection"
systems.49 Further, even firms with well-developed conflicts procedures at the
intake stage tend to lack systematic procedures for detecting conflicts that arise in
the course of representation. In her groundbreaking study of conflicts of interest
in 128 Illinois law firms, Susan Shapiro found that "the majority of firms... have
no special procedures or overseers for events and transformations that occur after
a case is underway.",
50
Ethical issues other than conflicts appear to get even less attention. A 1995
survey of peer review procedures in 191 Texas law firms found that only half of
the firms engage in any form of peer review, and those mainly on an informal
basis.5 1 In a 1999 survey of 487 associates practicing in Texas law firms, only
40% reported that their firms have formal billing guidelines other than those
imposed by clients, and 26% reported that they received no instruction on billing
43. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG
LAW FIRM 22 (1991).
44. See David E. Rovella, Living on the Edge, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at A l (reporting the results of the
National Law Journal's annual survey of the 250 largest U.S. law firms).
45. id.
46. See The NLJ 250; Branch Offices, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at C20 (reporting the size and location of
each branch office of the largest 250 firms).
47. See The Global 50 Survey, AM. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 86.
48. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Willkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law
Firms: A Callfor Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 691,696-702 [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins,
Promoting Ethical Infrastructure] (reviewing research on the development and effectiveness of specific
structural controls).
49. Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verite: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law
Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 305, 333, 324 (1997).
50. SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 325 (2002).
51. See Fortney, supra note 19, at 289.
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when they joined the firm.52
As Schneyer notes, the quality of a firm's ethical infrastructure may
significantly affect the incidence of firm members' misconduct.53 Had Baker &
McKenzie had effective procedures for confronting sexual harassment, for
instance, the firm might have prevented Martin Greenstein from repeatedly
harassing his secretary and avoided a high-profile lawsuit and the resulting
damages award.54 Likewise, billing guidelines, peer review procedures, and other
structural controls may help to prevent busy lawyers from cutting comers on a
day-to-day basis.55
Structural controls are not only important for deterring misconduct, however,
and it is a mistake to rest the case for structural controls on such narrow grounds.
First, some forms of misconduct-such as the knowing, egregious misconduct
cited by proponents of law firm discipline-are unlikely to be prevented by even
the most sophisticated ethical infrastructure. For instance, a managing partner
who bilks his clients out of $2.5 million and steals $1 million from his partners is
unlikely to be dissuaded by formal billing guidelines.56
More importantly, focusing solely on the prevention of unethical conduct
ignores the cultural and institutional benefits of formal structural controls.
Policies and procedures that explicitly promote compliance with ethical stan-
dards make a statement about firm values to firm members and to the broader
ethical community. Within the firm, such policies and procedures provide
guidance for well-meaning lawyers and may help them to resist informal pressure
to lower their practice standards. In the survey of billing practices cited above, for
example, 71% of associates agreed that "[c]lear billing guidelines would help
attorneys who want to practice ethically" to resist informal pressure to
over-report their hours.57
A firm's creation of specific types of ethical infrastructure also sends an
important signal to the managers of similar firms, who may feel institutional
pressure to follow suit. For instance, after Ernst & Young and KPMG separated
their auditing and consulting businesses, other large accounting firms faced
52. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soulfor Sale: An Empirical Study ofAssociate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture,
and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 239, 253-54 (2000).
53. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 10, 25.
54. See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 1159 (1998) (affirming the jury's finding that
"Baker & McKenzie had advance knowledge that Greenstein was likely to sexually harass employees... land]
it exhibited conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent
Greenstein's misconduct").
55. For instance, to insure compliance with conflicts checking procedures, some firms require lawyers to
complete a conflicts check in order to get a billing number on any new matter. See SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at
287.
56. See Lerman, supra note 20, at 212, 264 (discussing the case of Harvey Myerson).
57. Fortney, supra note 52, at 253-54.
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significant pressure to do likewise from investors, regulators, and clients.58
Moreover, institutional pressure for the adoption of specific compliance struc-
tures tends to grow as the number of firms with the structure increases. 59 Thus,
law firms' adoption of formal pro bono policies increased dramatically in the
1970s as a result of pressure from law students and labor market competition
between fins.
60
In emphasizing the cultural and institutional benefits of formal structural
controls, we do not mean to (naively) suggest that formal policies and procedures
necessarily govern informal practice. We recognize that there may be slippage
between policy and practice, and that simply adopting a policy does not
guarantee ethical conduct. However, large firm lawyers are prone to argue that
firm culture is more important than formal policies and procedures-as if formal
policies and procedures have no cultural significance. We think that this argument
is misguided. While it is true that formal policies and procedures may not govern
informal practice, there nevertheless is an important difference-that is, an
important cultural difference-between a law firm that has adopted formal ethics
policies and procedures and one that has not.6 1 Further, while some firms may
adopt formal ethics policies and procedures for purely symbolic reasons, over
time such policies and procedures may take on a substantive bite-especially
insofar as key partners have an incentive to promote their effectiveness. We
return to this point in our discussion of in-house compliance specialists, below.
B. THE ROLE OF LAW FIRM DISCIPLINE
Given that lawyers increasingly practice in large, multijurisdictional firms, and
given the increasing importance of structural controls within firms, we submit
that the profession's failure to promulgate ethical standards for firms constitutes a
significant breach of its duty of self-regulation. This breach threatens not only the
quality of modern private practice, but also the credibility of the entire
58. See Jonathan D. Glater, Deloitte Is Last Big Audit Firm To Revamp Consulting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
6, 2002, at Cf.
59. Research shows that "organizations adopt the structural trappings of legal compliance at a rate that is
directly proportional to the number of prior adopters." Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal
Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 479, 498 (1997) (reviewing research on the "structural
diffusion" of due process and equal employment protections). See also Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker,
Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform
1888-1935, 30 ADM. Sct. Q. 33 (1983).
60. See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 540 n.77 (1985); David B. Wilkins, Book Review:
Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV.
458, 475 (1994) (reviewing ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993)).
61. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 48, at 713-14 (arguing that the
existence of formal ethical infrastructure is an important component of law firm culture).
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disciplinary system. 62 As recent accounting scandals and the resulting oversight
legislation show, the profession's failure to engage in effective regulation of its
most powerful entities may result in the loss of the privilege of self-regulation
altogether.63
Asserting the profession's duty to regulate is the easy part of our argument,
however; crafting an effective regulatory strategy is a more formidable challenge.
Law firms vary enormously in size, structure, and management philosophy, as
well as in their areas of practice and jurisdictional location(s). Thus, while most
regulators would agree that law firms should be encouraged to maintain effective
structural controls, there is little prospect of defining structural standards that
make sense for all firms.
64
Further, experience teaches that direct enforcement of rules governing law
firms is likely to be infrequent, especially in the case of large, corporate law
firms. The disciplinary system is largely reactive to complaints by clients, and
corporate clients rarely complain to disciplinary authorities.65 In addition, in
most jurisdictions, the resources for enforcement are limited.66 Thus, in order to
be effective, law firm discipline must be efficient; that is, there must be a concrete
and readily measurable standard for compliance.
Bearing these constraints in mind, we propose a regulatory strategy built
around the emerging role of in-house compliance specialists, such as law firm
general counsel, loss prevention and risk management partners, and in-house
ethics advisors. Specifically, we propose that all law firms, regardless of size, be
required to designate one or more partners to be responsible for monitoring the
quality of the firm's ethical infrastructure; and that firms be encouraged to
compensate partners directly for this service.
Requiring in-house compliance specialists would capitalize on recent develop-
ments within law firms and provide a ready standard for compliance and
disciplinary enforcement. Requiring the designation of individual specialists also
62. See Symposium, supra note 24, at 212-14 (remarks of Elizabeth Chambliss).
63. In response to recent accounting scandals, Congress created a new oversight board for the accounting
industry, replacing the peer review system that had existed previously. See Floyd Norris, New Arbiters Of
Auditing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at Cl (discussing the proposal and creation of the accounting oversight
board).
64. Although New York adopted law firm discipline in 1996, three of the four Appellate Divisions of the New
York Supreme Court, which are in charge of administering the disciplinary system, have yet to issue
implementing regulations for the new rule. See ALAS Testimony, supra note 24. See also Elizabeth Chambliss,
MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity Regulation, 4 LEGAL ETHics 45, 48 (2002) (warning against
any effort to define one-size-fits-all structural standards for law firms).
65. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 1, at 6-8 (noting the infrequency of disciplinary
enforcement against the lawyers who work in large law firms); Symposium, supra note 24, at 205 (remarks of
William P. Smith).
66. Am. Bar Ass'n., Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report to House of Delegates
xxii (1991) (finding that the funding and staffing of disciplinary agencies "has not kept pace with the growth of
the profession," and that "some agencies are so underfunded and understaffed that they offer little protection
against unethical lawyers").
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would solve the problem of collective responsibility under Rule 5.1 (a). Finally,
requiring only the designation of an in-house compliance specialist would
provide an impetus for the development of ethical infrastructure within law firms,
while at the same time maximizing managerial freedom for firms.
6 7
C. THE CASE FOR SPECIALISTS
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly are turning to
in-house specialists to manage the firm's compliance with professional regula-
tion.68 In some firms, the specialist's role has evolved informally through
committee service,69 and carries an informal title, such as "ethics guru' 7 ° or
"conflicts czar."'" In other firms, the specialist's role is more formal, and
individual partners are compensated directly for serving as the firm's "general
counsel' 72 or "in-house ethics advisor."'73 In a number of firms, individual
partners have given up their outside practice to serve as full-time, in-house
advisors on ethics and regulatory matters. 74 Some firms have more than one
partner who serves as an in-house compliance specialist.
75
Commentators attribute firms' increasing reliance on in-house specialists to the
67. This model of "enforced self-regulation" has proven successful in other regulatory contexts where the
direct enforcement of one-size-fits-all standards is neither practical nor desirable. See IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-32 (1992) (defining
enforced self-regulation and discussing its strengths and weaknesses as a regulatory strategy). Under enforced
self-regulation, "each firm... is required to propose its own regulatory standards if it is to avoid harsher (and
less tailored) standards imposed by the state." Id. at 101.
68. See, e.g, Peter R. Jarvis, Ethics Advisors Watch Over Firms, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 15; Jonathan
Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor, Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1011, 1028-29 (1994); Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms Goes In-House. Legal Costs are Leading Firms, Like
Their Clients, to Look Inside for Advice, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A1; Daniel Kennedy, New Trend is
General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 29; David Hricik, Uncertainty, Confusion, and Despair:
Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 REV. LITIG. 706 (1997).
69. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8, at 565-66, 568 (examining the
evolution of specialists' positions in thirty-two law firms); SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 308-10 (discussing the
emergence of conflicts specialists in Illinois law firms). "Whatever the [conflicts] committee size, most firms
have one or at most two individuals [who are] involved in the day-to-day oversight of conflicts issues and do the
lion's share of the work." Id. at 310.
70. Hricik, supra note 68, at 706. "Most large law firms have their own in-house ethics gurus, people who are
expected to set policy and provide ethics advice on internal matters, malpractice claims and similar issues." Id.
71. SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 310.
72. See Taylor, supra note 68, at A l (discussing the creation of general counsel positions at Arter & Hadden
of Cleveland, Gardere & Wynne of Dallas, and Munsch, Hardt, Kopf, Harr & Dinan of Dallas); Kennedy, supra
note 68, at 29 (discussing the creation of a general counsel position at Winston & Strawn).
73. See Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000) (describing their own practice as in-house ethics advisors); Chambliss &
Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8, at 559, 565-66 (examining the formalization of the compliance
specialist position under a variety of titles).
74. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8, at 572-73, 580-83.
75. Id. at 568.
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increasing complexity of professional regulation76 and the increasing number of
claims against lawyers. 77 The emergence of in-house compliance specialists also
is consistent with a general trend toward the centralization and specialization of
law firm management. 78 Finally, ALAS, a mutual insurance company owned by
large law firms, has played an important role in promoting in-house compliance
specialists by requiring that insureds designate a "loss prevention partner" to
serve as the ALAS liaison. 79 Robert A. Creamer, Vice President and Loss
Prevention Counsel for ALAS, reports that there are over 875 loss prevention
partners in ALAS member firms. 80
Our research on the role of in-house compliance specialists in thirty-two law
firms finds that such specialists may play a significant role in promoting ethical
awareness and the quality of structural controls within firms.8 In addition to
responding to individual questions on a day-to-day basis, in-house specialists
may perform a variety of proactive services, including in-house training and the
assessment of internal compliance procedures.82 One "ethics partner" in our
sample described his role in his firm as follows:
I have spent an awful lot of time developing our intranet site as an ethics and
loss prevention library. We have links to every third party source I can find, the
rules of all states, the opinions and Cornell kind of stuff [referring to the legal
ethics section of the Cornell web site], but also more specialized things that are
increasingly becoming available. And then the materials I have created ... I
have, say, an outline on each of the major Rules of Professional Conduct and if
somebody said, "well, what's the rule on such and such, can you contact a
former employee under Rule 4.2," I may well have that on hand .... And then
you're able to say to people, "here's the answer and here's why ... and I'm not
76. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 1012 (stating that legal ethics "has become a substantive area of law
requiring specialized expertise"); Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 73, at 104 (stating that "in light of the increasing
complexity of legal ethics issues, it makes no more sense to have everyone at the firm be an expert in legal ethics
than it would to have everyone... be an expert in the details of ERISA ... ").
77. See Taylor, supra note 68, at A 1; Epstein, supra note 68, at 1012, 1018-24 (discussing the "growth in the
number and size of awards for legal malpractice").
78. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 43, at 48-49; ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 147-50 (1988) (discussing large law firms' tendency toward
bureaucratic organization and management); Steven Brill, The End of Partnership? AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 3
(discussing firms' increasing use of full-time managing partners); Mike France, Managing Partner: The Tender
Trap, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at Al (stating that "almost all [large firms] have one full-time (or nearly
full-time) leader who sets strategy, speaks to the press and hires lateral partners"); Special Report, Behind the
Scenes: D.C. Area Administrators on Bosses (Everyone), Budgets, and Business, LEGAL TIMES, May 21,2001, at
41 (discussing firms' use of professional managers).
79. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8, at 590; SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 38-39
(discussing the role of ALAS in the development of loss prevention efforts within firms).
80. Personal Interview with Robert A. Creamer, Vice President and Loss Prevention Counsel, Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society, Inc. (May 9, 2002).
81. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8 (reporting the results of an exploratory
study of in-house compliance specialists).
82. Id. at 573-76.
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making this up as I go along." If I did a job description I would have a section
on systems monitoring and systems planning. That is, I spend a certain amount
of time making sure our trust account is working the way it is supposed to...
you can't just leave that to the accounting people. I review-more than I care
to-our marketing materials and web site and that sort of thing because it is easy
to-especially when you are in a lot of different jurisdictions the way we are-to
say something on your central web site that, there's some stupid rule in some
state that says you can't say that kind of thing ... We do a fair amount of
non-lawyer ethics training too, and I think that's important ... because the
people in marketing and trust accounts and so forth ... For instance, how do
you know what is going on or what is not coming to your attention? ... Try
getting all the secretaries in the firm together and tell them what proper
notarization practice is, and see if you don't get a few phone calls afterwards.. 83
Our findings are consistent with other recent reports about the role of in-house
specialists in promoting individual compliance and compliance procedures
within law firms. For instance, in describing their own in-house ethics practice at
Stoel Rives, a Portland, Oregon firm, Peter Jarvis and Mark Fucile report that
they provide individual counseling; alert the firm to regulatory developments;
help the firm develop standardized forms (such as conflicts waivers); provide
in-house ethics training; publish a professional responsibility newsletter; main-
tain intranet and internet resources; and-when necessary-respond to bar com-
plaints and motions for disqualification.84
We found that specialists who are compensated directly for time spent on
ethics matters are more likely to be proactive in promoting the development and
effectiveness of internal structural controls.8 5 However, even the mere designa-
tion of special responsibility tends to motivate individual partners to invest in
promoting compliance.8 6 Most of the uncompensated specialists in our sample
report that they spend 300-500 hours per year on in-house service.87 As one loss
prevention partner, who is not compensated for this role, observed: "Being
anointed the ALAS representative does not require you to know anything about
ethics... but once you are named [the loss prevention partner], it's hard to avoid
some involvement."
Our proposal to require law firms to designate an in-house compliance
specialist is aimed primarily at increasing firms' accountability for structural
controls. Like ALAS, we believe that requiring firms to identify a specific,
responsible partner will provide an incentive for managers to focus on
in-house compliance efforts, as well as an incentive for the named partner to
83. Id. at 574-75.
84. See Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 73, at 106-11.
85. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 8, at 573-76.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 562.
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insist on management support. Requiring the designation of an individual
partner also may help law firm managers justify the cost of investing in
proactive compliance efforts, including the cost of direct compensation for
the named partner.
Our proposal also is aimed at increasing the authority and effectiveness of
specialists within firms. According to the specialists in our study, their authority
and effectiveness in promoting in-house compliance efforts depends significantly
on the visible support of top management. 88 Compensation, of course, is one way
to signal management support and, as noted above, requiring specialists may help
firms justify direct compensation. However, smaller firms may not need a
significant investment in in-house advising, and some firms may designate an
in-house specialist simply to comply with the rule, without expecting (or
investing in) actual compliance efforts.
Over time, however, even token compliance with our proposed rule would
contribute to specialists' collective authority and provide momentum for
more meaningful efforts. First, as the experience of the ALAS loss prevention
partner shows, the mere delegation of special responsibility provides an
incentive for the responsible partner to invest in the role. Furthermore, if all
law firms were required to designate an in-house compliance specialist,
specialists could seek support from each other where internal support is
lacking. In-house compliance specialists already have begun to form
professional networks through ALAS and the Association of Professional
Responsibility Lawyers (APRL). 89 Research in other regulatory contexts
suggests that such professional networks play a critical role in promoting
expectations for compliance and the institutionalization of compliance
procedures within firms. 90
A final argument for our proposal to require the designation of in-house
specialists is that such a requirement would be virtually self-enforcing. All a firm
would need to do to comply with our proposed rule would be to formally
designate a partner as the in-house compliance specialist. Compliance, therefore,
would be easy to assess: either a firm would designate an in-house specialist or it
88. Id. at 582-83.
89. Id. at 589-91 (discussing the emergence and importance of specialist networks).
90. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of
Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1416-17, 1434 (1990) (finding that the presence
of personnel professionals significantly increased the rate at which organizations adopted due process
protections in the late 1970s); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Low, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1546, 1565 (1992) (finding that between 1964 and 1990,
organizations with personnel departments created formal Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] policies at
almost twice the rate of other organizations); Edelman & Suchman, supra note 59, at 498-501 (reviewing
research on the role of lawyers and other compliance professionals in constructing organizational standards for
"compliance"). See also Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147 (1983) (discussing the
role of professional groups in shaping organizational norms).
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would not. Yet, as we have argued, even token compliance would provide a
significant impetus for the development of meaningful in-house compliance
efforts by firms.
D. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE DEBATE
We have not addressed the drafting of our proposed rule because we are
hesitant to argue for a specific textual amendment at this stage of the
conversation. Although we have been referring to a "requirement" that all firms
designate an in-house compliance specialist, a more modest-and perhaps less
controversial-approach would be to make such designations voluntary, for
instance by including a reference to the benefits of specialists in the Comment to
Rule 5.1.9'
This approach has some obvious drawbacks, given the infirmities of Rule
5.1(a) and the history of opposition to law firm discipline under that rule. For the
reasons discussed in Part I, we believe that it would be preferable to distinguish
the duties of firms as entities from the supervisory duties of individual partners.
Nevertheless, we are somewhat agnostic about the specific language and location
of any amendment that otherwise conforms to our suggested approach. For now,
our goal is to stimulate discussion about the essentials of our proposal; thus we
leave these drafting questions to future regulatory debate.
Our proposal also highlights thorny questions about the personal liability of
in-house compliance specialists and the specific ethical duties of the in-house
specialist's role. Like corporate counsel, in-house counsel in law firms face
special professional challenges in balancing their duties to the firm, its members,
its clients, and the public. Moreover, in-house counsel in law firms face
additional challenges as a result of the law firm setting and the emergent nature of
their role. However, given firms' increasing reliance on in-house compliance
specialists, the profession will have to address such questions regardless of
whether specialists are required by ethical rules. (Indeed, one might argue that a
systematic approach to the regulation of the in-house lawyer's role is long
overdue.) Thus, these questions, too, we defer to future debate.
CONCLUSION
Schneyer's proposal for law firm discipline began a vital conversation about
the growing importance of law firms as regulators of private practice and the
legal profession's duty to engage in meaningful regulation of firms. However,
recent debates about law firm discipline under Rule 5. 1(a) illustrate the limits of
the Rule 5. 1(a) framework and leave little hope for future proposals based on that
approach. This paper has suggested an alternative framework for law firm
91. See Chambliss, supra note 64, at 61 (discussing this approach).
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discipline based on the emerging role of in-house compliance specialists. Our
primary goal is to stimulate interest in the essentials of our proposal and to
reinvigorate the discussion about law firm discipline. We believe that the
profession's privilege of self-regulation requires lawyers, regulators, and schol-
ars to continue to work to implement an effective strategy for entity regulation.
We ought not let the current impasse stifle this important regulatory effort.

